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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON SECTION 48 OF
THE ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE ACT
MAXFIELD WEISBROD *
A MONG the innovations introduced by the Illinois Civil
Practice Act are those embodied in Section 481
thereof. These observations are confined to that section
and will make reference to other appropriate sections of
the Act and the Rules adopted by the Supreme Court
pursuant thereto only in so far as may be necessary for
a clear understanding of this section.
Since the provisions of this section were taken from
the New York Rules of Civil Practice, we must, until our
reviewing courts have passed upon them, look, at least in
part, to the authorities of that state for an interpretation
of these provisions. No doubt, our courts in construing
these various provisions will be inclined to give them a
construction similar to that given by the New York courts
unless such construction be contrary to the provisions of
our Act or be in conflict with the spirit or policy of the
law of our State.2 It is specifically provided in our Act
that it shall be liberally construed,8 and it would appear
that where the courts of review of New York have ren-
dered various technical decisions under its act, those
decisions should not, in view of the provisions of our Act,
be controlling, but merely persuasive.
Before analyzing the various provisions of this section,
it should be noted that the purpose of the provisions, as
*Member of Illinois Bar.
1 I11. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 172: "§ 48 (Involuntary dismissal for
certain defects.) Defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion
to dismiss the action or suit, where any of the following defects appear on
the face of the complaint, and he may within the same time, file a similar
motion supported by affidavits where any of the following defects exist but
do not appear upon the face of the complaint ... " The subsections are
hereinafter quoted in the body of this article.
2 Kerner v. Thompson, 365 Ill. 149 at 155, 6 N. E. (2d) 131 (1936).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 128.
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stated in a New York case,4 is the adaptation to actions at
law of the old equity practice of raising questions of law
by a plea in bar and having these questions determined
before pleading to the merits. It is also to be observed
that the provisions of this section are not mandatory.
Under our chancery practice as it existed prior to the
enactment of the Civil Practice Act, it was proper to file
demurrers and pleas to a pleading as the occasion re-
quired. The former chancery practice and the practice
under this section are analogous in that generally where
a demurrer would lie under the former chancery practice,
a motion would be proper now; and where a plea would
have been appropriate under the former chancery prac-
tice, a motion supported by affidavit would be appropri-
ate under this section. The practice of filing motions to
dismiss for causes apparent upon the face of a pleading
is not novel in Illinois, for it was not uncommon practice
in chancery for a defendant to present a motion to dismiss
a bill for want of equity apparent upon the face of the bill
and for the court to treat such motion as a general
demurrer.5 It may be said in passing that, under the
former chancery practice, a plea contained matter wholly
dehors the bill, as, for example, a release.6
In so far as Section 48 deals with defects appearing
upon the face of the complaint, it is merely an amplifica-
tion of Section 45 of the Act, which substitutes motions
for demurrers. The writer inclines to the opinion that,
when our reviewing courts are called upon to do so, they
will rule that the phrase "face of the complaint" also
includes by plain and fair inference the face of the
record. It is difficult to conceive how certain objections
which may be raised under the various provisions of this
section could appear on the face of the complaint. For
4 Herzog v. Brown, 216 N. Y. S. 134 (1926).
5 Lavin v. Comrs. of Cook County, 245 I11. 496 at 509, 92 N. E. 291
(1910) ; Leonard v. Arnold, 244 Ill. 429 at 432, 91 N. E. 534 (1910).
6 Stephens v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 260 Il. 364 at 367, 103 N. E.
190 (1913).
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instance, a motion to quash service of process may be
made under Section 48. It is quite apparent that a court
acquires jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, not
when the suit is instituted and the complaint filed, but
either by service of process or by his voluntary appear-
ance. Since the motion to quash may be made under Sec-
tion 48 and the basis for the motion appears from the
record other than the complaint, we are impelled to the
conclusion that the face of the complaint and the face
of the record will be deemed to connote the same thing.
But, as a practical matter, we need be little concerned
with the suggested conclusion in view of the proviso that
where the defects exist but do not appear on the face
of the complaint, a motion supported by affidavits may
be filed.
If the objection which is set forth in a motion made
pursuant to any of the provisions of this section appears
on the face of the complaint, plainly no affidavit need
accompany the motion; but where the defect does not
appear on the face of the complaint, then we must follow
the requirement that the motion be accompanied by a
contain such additional facts as may be necessary to in-
form the court of the nature of the objections which render
the complaint insufficient or improper and disclose the
defects and deficiencies complained of. If no counter-
affidavit is interposed, the allegations contained in the
supporting affidavit will be taken as true, and the court
will dispose of the motion upon that basis.7 If, however,
it is desired to contest the facts set forth in the support-
ing affidavit, the counter-affidavit will create the issue to
be determined by the court.
We further perceive that the motion to dismiss must
be filed within the time allowed for pleading. The corre-
sponding rule in New York provides that the motion must
7 Brandt v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 285 Il. App. 212 at 217, 1 N. E.
(2d) 873 (1936).
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be filed "within 20 days after service of the complaint,"
which, under the New York practice, is the time for plead-
ing. In Illinois the trial court in its discretion may extend
the time to file this motion." However, in New York it
has been held that where more than twenty days have
elapsed before service of the motion, the motion will be
deniedY
Prior to interposing a motion under any of the pro-
visions of this section, counsel would do well to give some
consideration to Sections 23, 24, 43, 44, and 45, together
with Section 49 and the rules made pursuant thereto, and
Rules of the Supreme Court numbered 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
and 21.
In order that the various subsections may be discussed
in an orderly fashion, they will be taken up in the sequence
in which they occur in the Act. In each case the defect
on account of which the motion to dismiss may be filed
is stated in the words of the Act.
SUBsEcTIoN (a)
"That the court has not jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant."
Our Supreme Court, in passing on this subsection, did
not follow the New York authorities. In the case of In re
Estate of Rackliffe 0 it was specifically held that a party
making a motion under this subsection of the Act did not,
by entering upon the trial, confer jurisdiction upon the
court and waive her right to have reviewed her motion
attacking the jurisdiction of the court. Our Act is dis-
tinguished from the New York Act in that our Rules of
Court 1 specifically provide that failure to take a direct
appeal from the denial by the court of a motion under
this section shall not be deemed a waiver of any error
8 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 183; ibid., § 259.8.
9 Gatner v. Levy,.218 N. Y. S. 296 (1926); Thurman v. B. & E. Gordon
Co., 213 N. Y. S. 249 (1926).
10 366 Ill. 22, at 27, 7 N. E. (2d) 754 (1937).
ll Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 25921.
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in the decision denying such motion, and the party shall
have the right to assign such error on appeal from such
judgment. Our courts have held that the filing of an an-
swer by the defendant after a denial of his motion to
dismiss is not a waiver. 2 As illustrative of motions to
dismiss that may be made under this subsection, the fol-
lowing will serve as examples: (1) where defendants are
members of a partnership, but service of process was not
had upon one of the partners ;13 and (2) where the Pro-
bate Court grants letters of administration upon a non-
resident of the county.1
4
At common law, lack of jurisdiction over the person
could be presented only by a dilatory plea and not by de-
murrer. In a chancery proceeding the defendant raised
the question of lack of jurisdiction over his person by
plea; the proper practice was to set the plea for hearing,
so that the sufficiency of the plea could be determined,
since a demurrer to a plea in chancery could not properly
be interposed.35 The proceedings upon the argument
upon a plea were nearly the same as those upon the argu-
ment of a demurrer.
TTU er thiS --nV;son r" a nf n li -nrnPo pos nr zo srv-
ice may be reached. It may be necessary to file a sup-
porting affidavit and to set out the necessary facts. Where
the facts are dehors the record, it is obvious that there
must be a supporting affidavit; but where the defect ap-
pears in the process itself or upon the return thereon,
it would seem that an affidavit should not be necessary.
Our courts take judicial notice of their own records,
16
12 Waters v. Heaton, 364 Il. 150 at 153, 4 N. E. (2d) 41 (1936) ; In re
Estate of Rackliffe, 366 Il. 22 at 28, 7 N. E. (2d) 754 (1937) ; Wright v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 281 Ill. App. 495 at 504 (1935).
13 Hoffman v. Wight, 137 N. Y. 621, 33 N. E. 554 (1893).
14 Bremer v. L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 318 Ill. 11 at 22, 148 N. E. 862
(1925); In re Estate of Trost, 292 Ill. App. 60 at 64, 2 N. E. (2d) 857
(1937).
15 Kircher v. Hamill, 239 Ill. App. 496 (1925) ; Martell v. Novack, 227
Ill. App. 501 at 503 (1923).
16 Sherman & Ellis v. Journal of Commerce, 259 Il. App. 453 at 459
(1930).
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and it would thus seem immaterial whether the lack of
jurisdiction appears on the face of the complaint or from
an examination of some other part of the record. As a
matter of precaution, it would be well to accompany a
motion with a supporting affidavit.
Undoubtedly the most common occasion for making a
motion under this provision would arise from insufficient
process, insufficient return of service of process, or a
false return. Where the objection is to the process itself,
the more logical motion to make would be a motion to
quash the summons or to quash the return. This pro-
cedure seems the more apt, since an insufficient process,
or an improper return by the sheriff, is no reason for dis-
missing a complaint; for should the summons be insuffi-
cient, the remedy would be by the issuance of another
summons; and if the return be improper, it could be
amended; and if the amendment were improper, the
remedy would lie by the issuance of a new summons and
service thereof. If this procedure is adopted, we have
the very interesting question as to whether the motion
should of necessity be made by a special appearance,
pursuant to the previous expressions of our courts that
a person appearing for the sole purpose of contesting
the jurisdiction of the court over his person must do
so by a special appearance,'17 and any other participation
in the case makes for a general appearance. 8 If Rule 21
is to be interpreted in the light of the decision of In re
Rackliffe, just referred to, we are apt to be confronted
with a drastic change in our procedure. A defendant
need no longer be troubled by the effect of his pleading
over after an adverse ruling upon his motion attacking the
jurisdiction of the court made under a special appearance,
for the rule specifically states that a denial of such motion
shall not be deemed a waiver of any error, and the defend-
17 Ladies of Maccabees v. Harrington, 227 Ill. 511 at 524, 81 N. E. 533
(1907).
18 Black v. Cosmopolitan Life Ins. Co., 264 Il1. App. 568 at 570 (1932).
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ant shall have the right to assign such error on appeal
from the final judgment.
However, under the New York code a special appear-
ance must be used, as at common law, when a motion to
dismiss is made predicated upon the objection that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.19
And in an Illinois appellate court case20 where a defend-
ant filed a special appearance and a motion asking the
court to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction
over the person and subject matter and giving reasons
therefor, and with such motion filed the equivalent of a
plea of res judicata asking the court to exercise its gen-
eral jurisdiction to pass upon the Statute of Limitations
and plea of res judicata, the court held that this action by
the defendant operated of itself to overrule the special
appearance and to make it the equivalent of a general
appearance.
Suppose, then, that a defendant is a foreign corpora-
tion, not licensed to do, nor doing, business in the state
and that service of process is had on an alleged agent or
officer of such corporation. The argument might be made
corporation was neither licensed to do nor was doing
business in the state. The writer inclines to the view that
the motion to be made should be one to quash the service
of process rather than a motion under this subsection.
An excellent illustration involving a set of facts quite
similar to the supposititious case is found in Goldey v.
Morning News,21 wherein suit was brought in the Su-
preme Court of New York by a citizen of that state
against the Morning News, a Connecticut corporation,
carrying on business in Connecticut only and having no
place of business, officer, agent, or property in New York.
19 Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 203 N. Y. S. 232
(1924).
20 Brandt v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 285 Ill. App. 212 at 215,
1 N. E. (2d) 873 (1936) ; note, 14 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 369.
21 156 U. S. 518, 15 S. Ct. 559, 39 L. Ed. 517 (1895).
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The action was commenced by personal service of the
summons in the city of New York upon the president of
the corporation, a citizen and resident of Connecticut
temporarily in New York. Thereafter, upon the petition
of the defendant, who appeared specially and solely for
the purpose of removal, the case was removed to the local
Federal court. Subsequently, the defendant, appearing
specially for the purpose of setting aside the summons
and the service thereof, filed a motion, supported by affi-
davits, to set aside the summons and the service thereof,
upon the ground that the defendant, being a foreign cor-
poration carrying on its business solely in another state,
transacting no business within the state of New York,
and having no agent clothed with authority to represent
it in the state of New York, could not legally be made a
defendant in an action by service upon one of its officers
temporarily in that state. Thereupon the Federal court,
after hearing the parties on a rule to show cause why
the motion should not be granted, ordered that the serv-
ice of the summons be set aside and declared to be null
and void. The plaintiff sued out the writ of error. The
court affirmed the finding and order of the trial court.
No point was raised by either party that the method pur-
sued, a motion to quash service of summons, was im-
proper. This procedure is that sanctioned in the major-
ity of the so-called code states.
Under our former practice, if the defendant raised the
question of jurisdiction over his person by motion and
the motion was overruled and defendant then pleaded in
bar, he waived any error in the ruling on his motion, and
the ruling was not reviewable, 22 provided that the court
otherwise had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
suit. In Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Associa-
tion,2 13 the United States Supreme Court held that where
22 Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hickson, 197 Ill. 117, 64 N. E. 248 (1902);
L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 136 at 141, 118 N. E. 483
(1917) ; Iles v. Heidenreich, 201 Ill. App. 619 at 624 (1916).
23 283 U. S. 522, 51 S. Ct. 517, 75 L. Ed. 1244 (1931).
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
the defendant appears and objects to jurisdiction over his
person, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction to decide
that question, right or wrong, so that thereafter the judg-
ment at most is only erroneous and not subject to collat-
eral attack.
The Rules of the Supreme Court24 providing for a mo-
tion to quash the writ, service, or return plainly imply
that any motion made to question the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant, so far as it ap-
pertains to service of process, should be made under the
cited rule rather than this provision of the Act.
SUBSECTION (b)
"That the court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter
of the action or suit, provided the defect cannot
be removed by a transfer of the case of
a court having jurisdiction
thereof."
The New York Act, as originally enacted, did not con-
tain the clause, "provided that the defect cannot be re-
moved by a transfer of the case to a court havin -,,r0s
diction." Subsequently, an amendment was made to the
New York Act which embodied such provision. It would
thus appear that the only decisions of New York courts
which would be helpful in determining the meaning of
this subsection must be in cases arising subsequent to
this amendment to the New York Act.
This subsection may not be interpreted to have ref-
erence to the transfer of an action from the law docket
to the equity docket, or vice versa, since provision for
such transfer is made in Section 44 of the Act. In this
connection, it is interesting, historically, to note that
Section 40 of the Practice Act of 1907 provided for the
transfer of a suit from the law docket to the chancery
24 M. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 259.8 (2).
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docket, or vice versa, although the terms of that section
were not as liberal as those of Section 44 of the Act.
It is difficult to understand just why subsection (b) was
enacted in the language in which it is expressed, in view
of Section 36 of our statute on Venue,2 5 which provides for
a change of venue when a suit is commenced in a wrong
court, and Section 37, which provides for a transfer of
civil actions between courts of record of concurrent juris-
diction in the same county.
If it appears that no state court has jurisdiction, the
action must be dismissed although jurisdiction may exist
in the local Federal Court, unless the case is one remov-
able from the State to the Federal courts under the Fed-
eral statute, in which case, of course, transfer is made
not by virtue of this subsection, but pursuant to the Fed-
eral statute.
An apt illustration of a situation where there was not
jurisdiction of the subject matter is found in Jacobus v.
Colgate,," where the plaintiff sought to recover for a for-
eign trespass. But the decision must be read in the light
of the New York laws, which are discussed in a masterly
fashion by Mr. Justice Cardozo, then a member of the
New York Court.
In another New York case in an action upon a contract
between the plaintiff, a resident of New York, and the de-
fendants, a German corporation and an individual, a resi-
dent of Germany, the latter moved the court to dismiss
upon the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the action by reason of a provi-
sion in the contract that in case of a dispute the German
courts should have sole jurisdiction.27 The court reversed
the order of the trial court dismissing the cause and, in
doing so, predicated its opinion solely upon this question
of jurisdiction.
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 146.
26 217 N. Y. 235, 11 N. E. 837 (1916).
27 Sudbury v. Ambi Verwaltung, etc., 210 N. Y. S. 164 (1925).
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SUBSECTION (C)
"That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sie."
There will be few instances when this objection will
appear on the face of a complaint. Natural persons and
corporations, unless they are under some disability, have
the right to sue, and the presumption will arise that they
are not under any disability until the contrary affirma-
tively appears. Persons purporting to sue in some repre-
sentative capacity must, of course, make some affirmative
showing that they have the right to maintain such action.
If there be no such showing, a motion to dismiss should
be entertained without any supporting affidavit, since the
complaint on its face would show that this deficiency
exists. For example, it may appear on the face of the
complaint that the plaintiff is a foreign administrator.
That would be a perfectly good objection in New York,28
but our courts have held that a foreign administrator
may maintain an action in this state for wrongful death.
2 9
As illustrative of a case where the defendant raised the
question of the capacity of the plaintiff to maintain an
action, reference may be had to Keslick v. Williams Oil-
0-Matic Heating Corporation,0 involving an action
brought for wrongful death charging a violation of the
Occupational Diseases Act. The suit was instituted by
the surviving widow as administratrix of the estate of
her deceased husband. Subsequent to the passing of more
than one year, the widow individually and a surviving
minor child were by an amendment substituted as parties
plaintiff. The minor child thereafter was dismissed as
party plaintiff leaving only the surviving widow as plain-
tiff, whereupon the defendant filed a special plea inter-
posing the Statute of Limitations, to which plea the
plaintiff demurred. Upon hearing, the demurrer was
28 Wikoff v. Hirschel, 258 N. Y. 28, 179 N. E. 249 (1932).
29 W., St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Shacklet, Admx., 105 I1. 364 at 382 (1883).
30 277 IM. App. 263 (1934).
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overruled, and as the plaintiff elected to stand by the
demurrer, judgment of nil capiat was entered. Upon
appeal, the Appellate Court held that the original decla-
ration did not state a cause of action since, under the
statute, none accrued to the administratrix and that the
provisions of Section 39 of the Practice Act of 1907 did
not prevent the running of the statute. The plaintiff then
obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court,"' where
it was held that since the Occupational Diseases Act had
previously been declared unconstitutional, a reversal of
the judgment would afford the plaintiff no advantage,
and thereupon the judgment was affirmed.
The language of this subsection would appear to be
broad enough to subject to its provisions a corporation
which is not in good standing, that is, a corporation
which, for instance, had not paid its franchise taxes as
provided by Section 142 of the Corporation Act.2 It is
to be observed, however, that that section of the Corpora-
tion Act provides that no corporation so in default shall
maintain any action at law or suit in equity, and our
Appellate Court has construed that section to mean, not
that the suit may be dismissed, but rather that it shall be
held in abeyance until the franchise taxes are paid.3 It
is the writer's opinion that the failure of a corporation
plaintiff to pay its franchise tax should more properly
be raised upon an answer under the above provision of
the Corporation Act and not under this subsection of the
Civil Practice Act. Of course, if that question is sought
to be raised under this subsection it would of necessity
be supported by a proper affidavit.
31 Keslick v. Williams Oil-O-Matic Corp., 360 Ill. 552, 196 N. E. 814
(1935).
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 32, § 157.142.
33 Romano & Co. v. Baird & Warner, 262 Ill. App. 165 (1931) ; Sheffield
S. & I. Co. v. Jos. Joseph & Bros. Co., 238 Ill. App. 45 (1925).
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SUBSECTION (d)
"That there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause."
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Practice Act the
objection of another action pending could be raised at
law only by an appropriate plea in abatement. In chan-
cery the objection of another suit pending would also
be raised by a plea in abatement. 4 Pleas in abatement
in chancery bear a close resemblance to pleas in abate-
ment at common law. It is to be observed that our Abate-
ment Act 35 is still in full force and effect; Section 27 of
that act, added in July, 1933, is to the effect that the pro-
visions of the Abatement Act should apply, so far as they
may be appropriate, to all cases not governed by the pro-
visions of the Civil Practice Act. But it would appear that
the benefits to be derived under this provision are of
rather dubious quality.
Perhaps what may be a not uncommon situation calling
for the use of this provision will occur where an action
is instituted by a party against some named defendant,
and then the plaintiff's assignor institutes an action
against the same defendant for the same matters.8 6 An-
other situation which might arise calling into play this
provision of the Act would be where a suit had been
instituted against the same defendant in two different
jurisdictions upon the same subject matter. Substan-
tially this question arose in Little v. Chicago National
Life Insurance Company.8 1 In making disposition of
the appeal, the Appellate Court specifically held that the
motion to dismiss was properly made under this subsec-
tion of the Act.
34 Haas v. Righeimer, 220 Ill. 193 at 196, 77 N. E. 69 (1906) ; Dukeman
v. Beisley, 250 11. App. 537 (1928).
35 ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 1.
86 Kelley v. Champlain Studios, 228 N. Y. S. 5 (1928).
37 289 IM. App. 433, 7 N. E. (2d) 326 (1937).
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In Leonard v. Bye,8 suit had been instituted in the
Superior Court of Cook County to recover from the de-
fendant the superadded stockholder's liability imposed
by the Illinois Constitution. The defendant filed his mo-
tion and affidavit which set forth that prior to the insti-
tution of the present case another suit for the same cause
of action was previously filed and was pending in the Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County. The motion to dismiss was
allowed. A direct appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
That court did not enter into any discussion of this pro-
vision of the Act but preferred to bottom its decision
upon the broad ground that the Superior Court properly
refused to inquire into the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court and that the rule contended for by the appellant
would be disruptive of the orderly process of our courts
and fatal to the well-known principle that there must be
an end to litigation.
SUBSECTION (e)
"That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment."
This subsection obviously provides for the defense of
res judicata. Under the Practice Act of 1907, such de-
fense had to be shown by a special plea in bar or by
appropriate allegations in the answer. It is difficult to
conceive of a well-prepared complaint where such defect
would appear on the face thereof.
It is, of course, impossible to state, without knowledge
of the issues to be raised, whether the defense of res
judicata would be one of law or of fact in any particular
case. If the question sought to be raised is whether there
was a particular judgment upon which the defendant
predicates such defense, a simple question of fact would
be presented. However, a situation might arise in which
the former adjudication would be binding upon persons
who were not parties to the record. For example, one
in whose behalf, or under whose direction, a suit is prose-
38 361 Ill. 185, 197 N. E. 546 (1935).
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cuted or defended would be barred by the judgment or
decree rendered in the suit, and parol evidence would be
admissible to show who was the real party in interest and
that such person conducted the litigation in the name of
another. 9 Again, if upon the face of the record the pre-
cise question raised in the later case does not appear to
have been determined in the former suit, and yet if its
determination was essential to the judgment rendered
in the former case, then extrinsic evidence would be ad-
missible to make the requisite showing.40 Our authorities
have held that parol evidence may be admitted to show
what was adjudicated upon in the former suit, but not
what the adjudication was.
4 1
Since the plea of former adjudication is an affirmative
defense it follows perforce that the burden of proving
such plea is upon the defendant, and he must show what
was determined by the former judgment relied upon, and
such proof must be clear, certain, and convincing.4 In
Brandt v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Company,43 the
defendant made a motion to dismiss the complaint and
with the motion there was filed the equivalent of a plea
of res judicata. Plaintiff contended that the defendant
did not maintain the burden of proving prior adjudication
under its defense of res judicata. The upper court stated
that under this section of the Civil Practice Act, where
affidavits as to certain facts are filed and no counter-
affidavits are presented, it will be presumed that the trial
court had sufficient evidence before it to justify the order
39 Smith v. United States Express Co., 135 Ill. 279 at 289, 25 N. E. 525
(1890) ; Harding v. Fuller, 141 Ill. 308 at 319, 30 N. E. 1053 (1892) ; Ward
v. Clendenning, 245 Ill. 206 at 223, 91 N. E. 1028 (1910).
40 Hunter v. Troup, 315 Ill. 293 at 297, 146 N. E. 321 (1925) ; Wells v.
Robertson, 277 Ill. 534 at 540, 115 N. E. 654 (1917) ; White v. Sherman,
168 Ill. 589 at 612, 48 N. E. 128 (1897).
41 Leopold v. City of Chicago, 150 Ill. 568 at 575, 37 N. E. 892 (1894);
Wright v. Griffey, 147 Ill. 496, 35 N. E. 732 (1893).
42 Smith v. Rountree, 185 Ill. 219 at 223, 56 N. E. 1130 (1900) ; Sawyer
v. Nelson, 160 Ill. 629 at 631, 43 N. E. 728 (1896).
43 285 I1. App. 212, 1 N. E. (2d) 873 (1936).
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dismissing the complaint; and thereupon it affirmed the
order of the trial court dismissing the case.
The only reason for a motion by defendant to dismiss
upon this ground is the desire to obtain a speedy deter-
mination of the suit. Apparently the thought back of this
subsection is the same as that which produced Section
57 of the Civil Practice Act, often called the section on
summary judgments.
Of course, the trial court is not always authorized to
try the issues presented upon a supporting affidavit and
counter-affidavits; it may be authorized only to determine
whether there is an issue to be tried. If such issue be
raised, there must be a trial, either by the court, or by
jury, if a jury be demanded. A determination by the
court that no issue is in fact raised would not infringe
upon the constitutional right of trial by jury. But powers
granted to a jury under our laws are exclusive, and they
are not shared with the trial judge to whom such powers
are not committed. If the trial court were permitted to
pass upon any issues of fact in a case where a jury de-
mand is on file, then, of course, the plaintiff would not
have a trial by jury.
44
SUBSECTION (f)
"That the cause of action did not accrue within the time
limited by law for the commencement of an
action or suit thereon."
This subsection should prove to be very advantageous
in effecting a rapid disposition of matters involving the
Statute of Limitations. Prior to the enactment of the
Civil Practice Act it was the practice in equity to permit
a party to raise the defense of the Statute of Limitations
by demurrer if apparent upon the face of the bill.45 The
defenses of the Statute of Limitations and of laches were
44 Mirich v. Forschner Contracting Co., 312 Ill. 343, 143 N. E. 846
(1924) ; Sinopoli v. Chicago Rys. Co., 316 Ill. 609, 147 N. E. 487 (1925).
45 Abbe v. Andrews, 239 Ill. App 104 at 115 (1925), certiorari denied.
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
treated as substantially identical defenses, and the defense
of laches could be taken advantage of by demurrer where
it appeared on the face of the bill. 6 In actions at law the
defense of the Statute of Limitations was regarded as
being in the nature of a privilege which a defendant might
interpose or not, as he wished; so a defendant desiring
to interpose such defense was required to plead it affirm-
atively ;17 it could not be raised by demurrer in an action
at law.
4 8
A possible exception may exist in actions for wrongful
death under the Injuries Act." Our reviewing courts are,
in such cases, not in accord upon the question of how to
raise the limitation, whether by demurrer or plea. In
Holden, Admx. v. Schley,50 our Appellate Court held
that a declaration not showing upon its face that the ac-
tion was brought within one year stated no cause of
action and would be insufficient to support a judgment
in the plaintiff's favor. A further appeal was prosecuted
by the plaintiff, and our Supreme Court reversed the
holding of the Appellate Court without definitely passing
upon this phase of the controversy.51 In Hartray, Admr.
V. LuItt, JU If4&wUk'y. UU11bPWIL&t,6 iaie )oUpIILIu .UUl
held that the declaration must positively aver or state
facts showing that the action was commenced within one
year from the day of death of the person injured and that
the omission of such statement made the declaration bad
on motion in arrest of judgment. This requirement is
based upon the fact that, since the action for wrongful
death is entirely a statutory one and the limitation is
imposed by the same act, the limitation is one on the
right itself and not merely on the remedy, and the plain-
46 Schultz v. O'Hearn, 319 Ill. 244 at 247, 149 N. E. 808 (1925) ; Foss v.
People's Gas Light Co., 293 Ill. 94 at 100, 127 N. E. 347 (1920).
47 Wall v. C. & 0. R. R. Co., 200 Ill. 66, 65 N. E. 632 (1902).
48 Capone v. Aderhold, 2 F. Supp. 280 at 282 (1933).
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 70, § 2.
50 271 Ill. App. 159 (1933).
51 355 Ill. 545, 190 N. E. 80 (1934).
52 290 Ill. 85 at 86, 124 N. E. 849 (1919).
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tiff must take the action with all conditions imposed up-
on it. Hence, in order to bring himself within the require-
ments of the act, the plaintiff must show that he brought
it within the required time. This view had previously
been followed by the Appellate Court5" under the original
act,54 where the limitation was two years, but the Supreme
Court reversed the decision and held that the limitation
should be raised by plea and not by demurrer.5 5 No dis-
tinction was there suggested between a limitation im-
posed by an act which creates a right and the general
Statute of Limitations.
In another case, decided by our Appellate Court,56 the
defendant, in the trial court, had moved in arrest of
judgment upon the ground that the declaration did not
state a cause of action and had urged in support of that
motion the fact that there was no allegation in the decla-
ration that the suit was commenced within one year after
the death of the deceased. The court held that such
allegation was unnecessary inasmuch as a bar by limita-
tion is a matter of defense. The court did say, however,
that the fact that the suit was brought within one year
after the deceased was killed was disclosed by the rec-
ord; and our Appellate Court has held that a declaration
in an action for wrongful death is not open to objection
because it does not aver that the action was commenced
within one year from the date of death of the person
injured where the record disclosed that the suit was
commenced within the statutory year.
5 7
The reviewing courts in New York have held that to
warrant the granting of a motion to dismiss under a
similar provision it must clearly appear from the record
53 Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 101 Ill. App. 431 (1902).
54 Laws 1853, p. 97.
55 Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co., 200 Ill. 66, 65 N. E. 632 (1902).
56 Crawford v. Bauer-Johnson & Co., 269 Ill. App. 185 at 190 (1933).
57 Elliott v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 262 I1. App. 466 at 470 (1931);
Burnham v. Peoria Ry. Co., 223 Ill. App. 573 at 575 (1921) ; O'Connell v.
Yellow Cab Co., 222 Ill. App. 118 at 127 (1921).
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without substantial dispute that the action is barred.58
In an action instituted in New York, the defendant pre-
sented a motion under a provision similar to ours and
supported it by his own and four corroborating affidavits,
averring facts which disclosed the defendant's right to
the defense of the statute of limitations. No counter
affidavits contradicting these facts were filed. The re-
viewing court held that the lower court should have
granted the motion since there was no issue to be tried.59
A case upon this subject that may profitably be read
is Squier v. Houghton," which discloses an extremely in-
teresting situation on this question of a motion to dismiss
a complaint. In addition to other grounds advanced for
dismissing the complaint, those of res judicata, release,
and the Statute of Limitations were presented. In sup-
port of this motion the defendants presented certain affi-
davits to which plaintiff replied. The motion was'granted
in part and denied in part. The court disclosed its reluc-
tance to dispose of a suit merely upon affidavits.
The New York courts have held that a motion to dis-
miss upon the ground that the cause of action did not
accrue to plaint ,wi hX,+in fi p tim limited for its com-
mencement may properly be raised under a provision in
its code similar to that contained in this subsection. 61
SUBSECTION (g)
"That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's
pleading has been released."
It is inconceivable that any intelligent pleader should
set forth in his complaint that his claim has been released.
58 Press v. Draper, 247 N. Y. S. 156 (1930).
59 Stern v. Auerbach, 197 N. Y. S. 295 (1922). Where the defendant
makes such a motion supported by appropriate affidavits to dismiss the com-
plaint under such provision, and where the facts are not controverted by the
plaintiff's affidavits, the motion must be sustained. Koerner v. Apple, 199
N. Y. S. 171 (1923).
60 226 N. Y. S. 162 (1927).
61 Haas v. New York P. G. Medical School, 226 N. Y. S. 617 (1928);
Peters v. Wells Fargo & Co., 207 N. Y. S. 657 (1925).
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If the defendant seeks to interpose a release in bar of the
action, the writer believes he should do so by answer to
which plaintiff might reply, rather than by a motion.
Under our former chancery practice a complainant might
anticipate a defense and allege any matter necessary to
explain or avoid it, 2 or failing to do so, after the filing
of an answer setting forth, for instance, the Statute of
Limitations, he might introduce the new matter into the
case by an amendment to the bill. s Certainly under our
decisions a release is an affirmative defense, and the
plaintiff would be permitted to show, for instance, that
the release was obtained from him by fraud or some trick
or device ;64 and our courts have further held that the
question of whether a release was obtained by fraud must
be submitted to a jury, notwithstanding the court be of
the opinion that it was fairly obtained and understand-
ingly executed, if the opposite conclusion would not be
manifestly against the weight of the evidence.65 Likewise
the question of whether a release of the plaintiff's claim
had been obtained by fraud or circumvention must be
submitted to the jury66 and also the question of whether
plaintiff signed the supposed release when in great pain
and without knowing its character.
6 7
In a New York case where a motion was made to dis-
miss the complaint predicated upon a release of the claim
executed by plaintiff, who claimed duress in the procure-
ment of the release from him, the court held that the issue
62 Nelson v. Wilson, 331 Ill. 11 at 15, 162 N. E. 144 (1928).
63 Dustin v. Brown, 297 Ill. 499 at 511, 130 N. E. 859 (1921); Fitch v.
Miller, 200 Ill. 170 at 184, 65 N. E. 650 (1902).
6 Jackson v. Security Life Ins. Co., 233 Ill. 161 at 164, 84 N. E. 198
(1908) ; Papke v. Hammond Co., 192 Ill. 631, 61 N. E. 910 (1901) ; Reitz v.
Yellow Cab Co., 248 Ill. App. 287 at 292 (1928); Monahan v. St. Paul Coal
Co., 193 Il. App. 308 at 311 (1915).
65 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. McClain, 211 Ill. 589 at 594, 71 N. E. 1103
(1904).
66 Vaughan v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 201 Ill. App. 241 (1916).
67 C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Jennings, 217 Il. 494 at 495, 75 N. E. 560 (1905)
Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Uhter, 212 Ill. 174 at 176, 72 N. E. 195 (1904);
Pioneer Cooperage Co. v. Romanowicz, 186 Ill. 9 at 13, 57 N. E. 864 (1900)
Whitney & Starrette Co. v. O'Rourke, 172 IIl. 177 at 182, 50 N. E. 242
(1898).
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should be submitted to a jury.8 However, in a case de-
cided in 1932, one of the intermediary reviewing courts
of New York, under a similar provision, held that a mo-
tion to dismiss a complaint, predicated upon the plain-
tiff's having released his cause of action, was properly
granted,69 but the plaintiff was given leave to file an
amended complaint so that he might set forth additional
facts which would obviate the defense interposed by the
release.
In another New York case" one of the motions made
to dismiss the complaint was based upon the ground that
the cause of action had been discharged by a general
release under seal, for a valuable consideration, which
had not been tendered back or returned. The principle
of this case is an exception to the statement made in the
first sentence under the subsection. The facts in the case
cited disclose an unusual situation in which plaintiff quite
properly pleaded a release obtained by alleged fraud and
deceit.
In a fourth New York case, 7' the defendant moved for
judgment upon the complaint and presented an affidavit
alleging a saisfactioni o. te C se-Ul 1 i l I om-
plaint. The plaintiff filed no affidavit in opposition to
the motion. The court held that since the facts were not
controverted, the complaint should be dismissed pursuant
to a similar provision in the New York Rules of Civil
Practice.
SUBSECTION (h)
"That the claim on which the action or suit is
founded is unenforceable under the provision
of the statute of frauds."
The defense of the statute of frauds like the defense of
the statute of limitations is in the nature of a privilege
68 Rizzuto v. United States Shipping Board E. F. Corp., 210 N. Y. S. 482
(1925); Perloff v. Kelmenson, 233 N. Y. S. 861 (1929).
69 Gray v. Fogarty, 261 N. Y. S. 842 (1932).
70 Willett v. Chase Nat. Bank, 219 N. Y. S. 289 (1926).
71 Swan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 222 N. Y. S. 111 (1927).
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which may be asserted or waived. Under our former
practice act, where it appeared from the face of the
declaration that the agreement sued on was within the
statute of frauds and failed to meet its requirements,
advantage thereof might be taken by a general demur-
rer." This defense can be disposed of in a summary
manner and more expeditiously by a motion under this
subsection than by an answer.
Of course, if the defense of the statute of frauds is not
apparent from the face of the complaint, the motion
would require support by a suitable affidavit or affidavits
setting forth the necessary allegations. This, of course,
would not preclude the plaintiff from filing a counter-
affidavit if he desired to raise an issue of fact. This is an
apt illustration of the analogous manner in which de-
murrers and pleas were used under the prior chancery
practice heretofore referred to.
The manifold situations in which the defense of the
statute of frauds might properly be interposed is dis-
closed, in part, in a number of New York decisions.
Briefly, they are as follows:
The plaintiff alleged an oral promise that if the plain-
tiff married the defendant she would have dower interest
in certain realty. The motion to dismiss on the ground
that the promise was within the statute was granted.73
In an action for specific performance to compel the
conveyance of certain real estate, the defendant moved
to dismiss upon the ground that the contract upon which
the action was founded was unenforceable by reason of
the statute of frauds. The motion was supported by
appropriate affidavits, to which plantiff filed a counter-
affidavit. The court held that the issue thus raised was
one of fact to be determined accordingly.
74
72 Lundquist v. Child, 182 Ill. App. 585 (1913, abst. dec.).
73 Browning v. Browning, 243 N. Y. S. 322 (1930).
74 Garfunkel v. Malcolmson, 217 N. Y. S. 32 (1926). Similarly in Herzog
v. Brown, 216 N. Y. S. 134 (1926), an action for damages for breach of
contract.
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In an action to recover for the breach of an oral con-
tract to give the plaintiff a written employment contract,
the defendant moved to dismiss, with a supporting affi-
davit, on the ground that the alleged contract sued on was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The plaintiff
filed a counter affidavit which set forth facts insufficient
to show that the contract was enforceable. The court sus-
tained the motion.75
The plaintiff sought to recover for commissions arising
out of an oral contract to make and execute a mortgage.
The defendant moved, with success, to dismiss upon the
ground that the statute of frauds was a bar to the en-
forcement of such an oral agreement.7 6
SUBSECTION (i)
"That the cause of action did not accrue against
the defendant because of his infancy or
other disability."
It is quite probable that the complaint would not dis-
close the fact that the defendant was under any of the
disabilities which might be a defense under this provision
so that if the defendant desired to interpose such defense,.
it would be done preferably by answer rather than a mo-
tion. The question whether the defense should be inter-
posed by motion or by answer, taking into consideration
the previous expression of our reviewing courts upon the
liability of minors, would be whether a pure question of
law or one of fact was to be presented. For example,
our courts have held that a minor will be liable only for
necessaries, and they have defined "necessaries" to be
"such things as supply the personal needs of an infant,
either those of his body, such as food, clothing, lodging
and the like, or those of his mind, as instruction suitable
75 Deutsch v. Textile Waste Merchandising Co., 209 N. Y. S. 388 (1925).
76 S. W. Straus & Co. v. Felson, 215 N. Y. S. 534 (1926).
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and requisite for the proper development of his mind."
77
Our courts have further held that the rights of a minor
who seeks to avoid a contract for the purchase of per-
sonalty are fixed and determined by the law and not by
the contract.7 8 It has also been decided in this state that
a minor cannot commence or engage in a legal proceeding
in his own name. He cannot appear by an attorney but
must appear, if at all, by a representative, such as a gen-
eral guardian, guardian ad litem, or next friend. 9 In light
of these authorities, it appears that it would be difficult
to assert a defense of infancy by motion.
In a New York case, a mother had filed suit against her
minor son for personal injury arising out of the negli-
gent operation of the son's automobile in which the
mother was riding, and the court held that the complaint
was erroneously dismissed since it stated facts from
which it might have been found that the son had been
emancipated."' The question is here passed by whether a
son may be liable to his mother for torts committed by
the son upon the mother.
SUBSECTION (2)
"A similar motion may be made by the plaintiff in case
of a counter-claim, under similar circumstances."
The observations above made with regard to motions
on behalf of the defendant to dismiss are of course ap-
plicable to counter claims; so no discussion is needed
under this subsection.
77 Lein v. Centaur Motor Co. of Illinois, 194 Ill. App. 509 (1915).
78 Fuller v. Pool, 258 Ill. App. 513 at 516 (1930).
79 Waechter v. Industrial Com., 367 Ill. 256 at 258, 11 N. E. (2d) 378
(1937).
80 Crosby v. Crosby, 246 N. Y. S. 384 (1930).
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SUBSECTION (3)
"If, upon the hearing of such motion, the opposite party
shall present affidavits or other proof denying the facts
alleged or establishing facts obviating the objection,
the court may hear and determine the same and
may grant or deny the motion; but if disputed
questions of fact are involved .the court may
deny the motion without prejudice and shall
so deny it if the action is one at law and
the opposite party demands that the
issue be submitted to a jury."
It is quite apparent from the language of this subsec-
tion that it was the intention of the framers of the Act
that the court shall hear the disputed questions upon
affidavits and counter-affidavits within the discretion of
the court, except, of course, in a case where a trial by jury
has been demanded. It is further to be observed that
the subsection provides that upon a hearing of such mo-
tion the opposite party may present affidavits or other
proof. A strict construction of that language apparently
means that the moving party may present only afidavits,
but that the opposite party might introduce oral evi-
dence, and he would only be required to meet the matters
set out in the supporting affidavits filed by the moving
party.
Apparently it was not intended that the moving party
might introduce oral evidence in support of his motion or
his affidavits. It would thus appear that the provision
as to other proof is for the adverse party, the moving
party being restricted to his motion and affidavits, if any.
Should the court see fit to permit the adverse party to
adduce oral evidence, this would certainly be permissible
under this subsection of the Act. The writer is aware of
no case in which oral evidence was adduced by the ad-
verse party, although it can be assumed without refer-
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ence to any instance that quite frequently documentary
evidence is appended to affidavits by either party, and
apt reference is made thereto in the affidavit.
Are we to construe the language of this subsection to
mean that the court which hears the motion shall exercise
its judicial discretion in the matter? Apparently the
framers of the Act intended just this, for we must take
notice of the fact that in Section 45 the word "shall"
is used, whereas in this subsection the word "may" is
used. Certainly it was intended to create some distinc-
tion; and one is perforce compelled to adopt the conclu-
sion that under this subsection the court is given a gen-
erous latitude, which we are wont to call judicial discre-
tion, in determining the method of disposing of a motion
made pursuant to this subsection where the opposite
party has not demanded the submission of the issue to
a jury. This conclusion is, of course, strengthened by the
statement in this subsection that the court "shall" deny
the motion without prejudice where the opposite party
has demanded "that the issue be submitted to a jury."
We thus have the result that where a cause is to be sub-
mitted to the court without the intervention of a jury,
and a motion to dismiss is made under any of the provi-
sions of this section, the case would be heard upon a
motion and perhaps, in addition, affidavits. Trial by
affidavit offends our sense of justice. Personally, the
writer is violently opposed to trying issues upon affi-
davits. In such cases we are excluded from the right of
cross-examination, we do not have the benefit of the phy-
sical presence of the affiant, and in all probability the
language of the affidavit would be that of the attorney
and not of the affiant, which in effect sometimes means
that we have, not the affidavit of the subscriber, but
rather the statement of the attorney. This argument,
however, ignores the provisions of Section 69 of the Act,
which gives the court discretion to require the presenta-
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tion of evidence by oral examination of the witnesses.
Could not either party suggest to the court that the ends
of justice would best be served by permitting oral exami-
nation of witnesses pursuant to this section? If the court
entertained the suggestion and permitted such oral ex-
amination, should the court restrict the oral proof to the
adverse party, upon the suggested theory? Or may not
the court, pursuant to the provisions of Section 69, per-
mit both parties to introduce oral evidence in support of
their respective affidavits and motions?
The courts in New York have held, where the affidavits
submitted by the moving party clearly disclose the de-
fense and the adverse party does not present affidavits or
other proof, that the court must dismiss the action."
At this point, it may be well to repeat that our sub-
section 3 provides that if disputed questions of fact are
involved, the court shall deny the motion if the action
is one at law and the opposite party demands that the issue
be submitted to a jury. But when must the demand for a
jury be made? Section 64 of the Act provides that the
plaintiff must make his demand for a jury at the time suit
is commenced and that a defendant desirous of a trial by
jury shall make his demand at the time of filing his ap-
pearance. Section 64 further provides that if the plain-
tiff files a jury demand and thereafter waives it, the
defendant shall be granted a jury trial upon motion made
at the time of such waiver and upon the payment of the
required fee. We also have the interesting question of
whether the defendant waives his right to a trial by jury
when he presents a defense by motion and affidavit, since
he has elected to present such defense by a method which
does not admit of a jury trial. It may well be that the
defendant should file his appearance and jury demand
and pay the required fee prior to or at the same time
he files his motion, or he might have his motion serve as
81 Stern v. Auerbach, 197 N. Y. S. 295 (1922).
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his appearance and pay the required fee for appearance
and jury demand and thus preserve his right to a trial by
jury and abide the future event of the disposition of
his motion.
Again, shall the common-law rules of evidence apply
at a hearing upon the motion and supporting affidavit?
What rules of evidence apply? Let us assume that mat-
ters alleged in an affidavit would not be competent evi-
dence upon a trial before the court and a jury; shall the
opposite side first move the court to strike from the
affidavit the objectionable matter and, having had a hear-
ing upon that motion, then have another hearing upon
the original motion and supporting affidavit?
Let us assume that the defendant has made a motion
to dismiss under any of the above provisions, with or
without a supporting affidavit, depending upon the nature
of the motion, and that the trial court upon hearing
denies the motion; can the defendant have the issues so
raised reviewed before proceeding further in the nisi
prius court? The Act appears to be silent upon the
question. Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court could remedy
the defect by appropriate rules and provide for the nec-
essary procedure granting and governing adequate re-
view.
This subsection may well be subjected to attack as be-
ing unconstitutional since it attempts to restrict to ac-
tions at law the principle that issues of fact shall be sub-
mitted to a jury. It may well be that, if the constitu-
tionality of this subsection is squarely presented to our
Supreme Court, the court would reach the conclusion, in
order to avoid holding the subsection unconstitutional,
that the language used is merely illustrative and not
exclusive. It would seem that only by such reasoning
could the court avoid holding the subsection unconstitu-
tional.
There can be little doubt now that parties litigant in
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will contests have the right to a trial by jury-and that the
verdict of the jury is binding and has the same force and
effect as a verdict at law ;82 and there can be little doubt
that either party to a divorce proceeding may have it
heard by a jury, with all the concomitant features of a
trial at common law, and that the verdict has the same
force and effect, not being merely advisory, as in an ordi-
nary chancery suit.8 It is further to be observed that
while Rule 11 seems to carry out the thought back of this
subsection, it fails to take cognizance of suits in equity
in which the verdict of a jury is binding. But we must
not overlook Section 63 of the Act which provides for
juries in equity cases. One is left to speculate whether,
in fact, it was intended to effect any change in chancery
practice so far as trial by jury may be a feature thereof.
In Sullivan v. Hillside Fluor Spar Mines"4 the plaintiff
instituted suit in the Superior Court of Cook County to
recover damages under the Occupational Diseases Act.
At the time the suit was instituted, the plaintiff demanded
a trial by jury. The defendant filed a motion to strike
each count and dismiss the complaint upon the ground
tLha the cUUoL llUtU o JUr1sUtUUion l o le p uceUig.
With the motion was filed a supporting affidavit. The
plaintiff filed a counter-motion to strike the supporting
affidavit or, in the alternative, to be permitted to file a
counter-affidavit, and that the issues be submitted to a
jury. The trial court, permitting the filing of the counter-
affidavit, refused to strike the other affidavit, refused to
submit the issues to a jury, and dismissed the complaint.
The plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court
and squarely presented the proposition that it became
the duty of the trial court to submit the issues to a jury
82 Kellan v. Kellan, 258 IM. 256 at 258, 101 N. E. 614 (1913); Louby v.
Key, 258 IMi. 558 at 563, 101 N. E. 946 (1913) ; Dowie v. Sutton, 227 IMi. 183
at 190, 81 N. E. 395 (1907).
83 Garrett v. Garrett, 252 Ill. 318 at 327, 96 N. E. 882 (1911) ; Razor v.
Razor, 42 Ill. App. 504 at 508 (1891).
84 360 Ill. 607, 196 N. E. 826 (1935).
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and that its failure to do so was in violation of this sub-
section of the Civil Practice Act. The Supreme Court did
not pass on this question but stated that, since the plain-
tiff could not maintain his cause of action based on the
Occupational Diseases Act for the reason that it was
unconstitutional under the previous decisions of that
court, the question as to whether plaintiff was entitled
to a jury trial on the issues made in the trial court by
motion and affidavit became immaterial.
Our Appellate Court has had occasion to pass upon
this subsection"' and has held that, where affidavits are
filed embodying certain facts and no counter-affidavits are
filed thereto, the court would presume that the trial court
had sufficient evidence before it to justify the entry of
an order based upon the motion and supporting affidavits.
The court then added the sentence, "This is particularly
true where the record shows no request by plaintiff to
submit the facts alleged in said motion to a jury."
In a subsequent case88 the plaintiff, as assignee, sought
to enforce a deficiency decree by means of a creditor's
bill. The defendant filed an answer and a counterclaim,
the counterclaim praying that the plaintiff be perpetually
enjoined from enforcing or attempting to enforce the de-
ficiency decree. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the
defendant's answer and counterclaim, which motion the
trial court granted. On an appeal from that decision, the
Appellate Court held that the plaintiff, in making his
motion, was required to set up so much of the proceedings
had and relied upon in the suit wherein the deficiency de-
cree was rendered as would supply the necessary infor-
mation, and that the method of doing so should have been
pursuant to the provisions of this subsection of the Civil
Practice Act.
85 Brandt v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 285 Ill. App. 212, 1 N. E. (2d)
873 (1936).
86 Tabero v. Sutkowski, 286 Ill. App. 225 at 229, 3 N. E. (2d) 115 (1936).
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SUBSECTION 4
"The raising of any of the foregoing defenses to the
action by motion shall not preclude the raising of
them subsequently by answer unless the court
shall have made a decision therein; and a
failure to raise any of them by motion
shall not prejudice raising them by
answer."
This subsection plainly contemplates that a defendant
may exercise his discretion in determining whether to
raise by motion or by answer any of the defenses afforded
to him by this subsection and that only when a decision
is made upon a motion shall the defendant be precluded
from raising the same defense by answer.
A careful analysis of the subsection will disclose that it
provides for no drastic change in our procedure as it
formerly existed. Certainly, prior to the enactment of
the Civil Practice Act, where a demurrer had been filed
to a pleading, the demurrant might, at any time prior to
hearing on the demurrer, ask leave to withdraw it and
to plead to the bill or declaration. We should read this
subsection in connection with Rule 21 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court to find that liberal practice which the Act
itself contemplates. This is aptly illustrated by the pro-
vision in the rule that if a defendant has entered a special
appearance and a motion attacking the jurisdiction of the
court, which motion the court overrules, and thereafter
the defendant enters upon the trial, such action does not
waive any error in the decision upon the motion made
under the special appearance.8 7
Our Appellate Court has held that where a complaint
did not state a cause of action, the defendant by pleading
over after its motion to dismiss was overruled, did not
waive its right to urge the question upon appeal.88 How-
87 In re Estate of Rackliffe, 366 Ill. 22 at 28, 7 N. E. (2d) 754 (1937).
88 Wright v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 281 Ill. App. 495 at 504 (1935);
Waters v. Heaton, 364 Ill. 150 at 153, 4 N. E. (2d) 41 (1936).
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ever, this procedure has always been the practice in Illi-
nois where the declaration was insufficient to support a
judgment.8 9
Assume that a defendant had raised any one or more
of the defenses available to him under this subsection and
an adverse ruling was made by the trial court; if the de-
fendant should again raise these same defenses in his
answer, the plaintiff undoubtedly would immediately
move to strike them from the answer on the ground that
the court had already passed upon them and that they
were therefore res judicata. Could not the defendant now
say that the judge who heard the first motion, whether
he be the same judge then hearing the motion to strike
or some other judge, had committed error, and that there-
fore he was entitled to raise the question anew? Cer-
tainly under our former practice, the trial judge, at any
time before trial, where he was satisfied that an erro-
neous ruling had been made on the sufficiency of any
pleading, could set aside the order and cure the error
without regard to whether he or some other judge had
made the ruling in question and without regard to the
fact that more than a term had elapsed between the
former ruling and the present ruling.90
Our Appellate Court has expressed itself to the effect
that, where the court has ruled against a defendant who
had made a motion under this section of the Civil Prac-
tice Act, the defendant was thereafter precluded from
raising the same question in his answer,91 and the re-
viewing court held that the trial court properly struck
the defenses in question from the defendant's pleading.
89 People v. Powell, 274 Ill. 222 at 224, 113 N. E. 614 (1916).
90 Shaw v. Dorris, 290 Ill. 196 at 204, 124 N. E. 796 (1919) ; Dowie v.
Priddle, 216 Ill. 553 at 556, 75 N. E. 243 (1905); Ft. Dearborn Lodge v.
Klein, 115 Ill. 177 at 181, 3 N. E. 272 (1885) ; Mater v. Silver Cross Hos-
pital, 285 Ill. App. 437 at 440, 2 N. E. (2d) 138 (1936) ; Luther v. Mathis,
211 Ill. App. 596 at 599 (1918).
91 Randall Dairy Co. v. Pevely Dairy Co., 278 Ill. App. 350 at 358 (1935);
ibid., 291 Ill. App. 380 at 387, 9 N. E. (2d) 657 (1937), where the court
reaffirmed what it said in its first decision; Hitchcock v. Reynolds, 278 Ill.
App. 559 at 563 (1935).
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However, it will be observed that the defendant appar-
ently did not raise the question of the possibility of an
erroneous ruling by the trial court upon its previous
ruling.
It is hoped that many of the perplexing problems en-
gendered by these provisions and the other sections of
the Civil Practice Act will soon be presented to our Su-
preme Court so that we may have the benefit of its opin-
ions, and if any changes be needed to give us the best
code now extant, we should be able to secure it in view
of the readiness of our Legislature to enact such addi-
tional remedial legislation as may be necessary to achieve
that end.
